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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

FLORA M. ROBISON,
Plaintiff and Respondent
-vs.PETE WILLDEN, .a minor by and
through his guardian Ad Litem, MARVELL WILLDEN, and MARVELT_j
WILLDEN,
Defendants and Appellants

Ca.se No.
8597

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff, age· 73, brought this action to recover
damages for her personal injuries reeeived as a result
of an automobile accident. The accident occurred on
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October 18, 1.955, at dusk (Tr. 44), at approximately
6:00 o'clock P.M. (Tr. 5; 43), when the car in which
she was riding, driven by her husband, age 83, while
making a left turn, w,as struck by the defendant's opposite bound car.
The accident occurred on Fifth East Street, a fourlane thoroughfare running north and south in Salt Lake
City, Utah, and near the intersection of Hawthorne
Avenue, which intersects on the east side of Fifth E'ast
Street only. (Tr. 43; Exhibit P-3; Tr. 46)
Fifth E.ast Street provides four lanes of traffic,
the opposite bound traffic lanes being separated by
painted double yellow lines in the center of the highway.
There are additional parking lanes provided against
each curb (Tr. 44). The entranceway to Hawthorne
Avenue, where the plaintiff and her husband reside, is
13 feet four inches wide, the approximate width of many
priv~ate driveways (Tr. 16).
The plaintiff and her hu.sband, at the tune of the
accident, were en route to their home on Hawthorne
Avenue fron1 downtown Salt Lake City. l\Ir. Robison
was driving south on Fifth East Street. Although an
eye witness, Frank Bo\vn1an, "~ho \Vas driving south on
Fifth East Street in the inside lane of travel, testified
that Mr. Robison had 1nade the. left tuTn from tl1e outside l~ane of tr.avel aeross the path of the 'vitness and
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a car ahead of the witness (Tr. 78; 82), we will \COnsider the facts £avorable to the plaintiff, as we must
for the purposes of this statement. He was driving
south in the inside lane of travel, the lane nearest the
center double lines separating oppo~site bound vehicles.
Southbound traffic was fairly heavy (Tr. 40; 78; 82),
but Mr. Robison testified there were no northbound
vehicles in the one-half block south of Hawthorne
Avenue, excepting the defendant's vehicle (Tr. 12;
),
which was 300 feet south of the Robison vehicle when
the plaintiff's car started its left turn (Tr. 17; 21; 26).
Before starting his left turn, and as he approached
the area where he intended to turn left, Mr. Robison
testified (Tr. 6) :
"I think I stopped. If I didn't stop suddenly,
I slowed up mighty slow before I did make the
turn.''
Mr. Robison did not give a hand signal to indicate
his intention to turn, but testified that his left turn
light signals were on (Tr. 6). It wa.s getting dusk at
the time, but not dark enough to require headlights and
the headlights on the plaintiff's vehicle were not on
(Tr. 22). After starting hi'S left turn, the plaintiff's
vehicle was struck by the defendant's opposite bound
car, the point of impact, with relation to the cars being
undisputed, that is, the right front of the defendant's
car with the right front door, .a.nd thereafter the right
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side and rear of the plaintiff's car (Tr. 17; 47; et al).
The impact shoved the rear of the plaintiff's vehicle
around to the east, where the rear of the Robison car
struck a car parked north of Hawthorne Avenue (Tr. 47).
During the accident, the right front door of the Robison
car sprung open, and the plaintiff fell to the street
beside the car where it had come to rest following the
accident.
Officer Cahoon, the inve.stigating officer at the
scene, testified ( Tr. 51) that he established the point
of impact .as six feet into the inside lane for northbound
traffic. Eye witness Bowman (Tr. 80; 81) also placed
the point of impact in the inside lane, verifying the
defendant's testimony. However, the plaintiff's husband
testified (Tr. 18) :

"I was probably in the outside lane (at the
time of impact) but just about the right distance
for him to hit my right front door."
(Tr. 17)
"A. He hit the front door first, and he was in
the outsid·e l:ane next to the parking lane.
Q. That would be in this lane which I am marking

X'
A. I suppose that is the lane he would have been
in. He wouldn't have been over in the lane
next to the curb."
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The plaintiff's husband, registered owne:r of the
vehicle he was driving, assigned his cause of action
for damages to the car to his wife, the plaintiff.
The trial was held without a jury, and .at the conclusion of the evidence the Court found the issues in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, and
awarded her damages for her injuries, but denied recovery for the damages to the: Robison vehicle, the
Court's finding~s being:
"that the negligence of the defendant, Pete
Willden, consisted of failure to maintain a proper
and reasonable lookout, and failure to yie~ld the
right-of-way to the vehicle in which plaintiff was
riding as a passenger.'' (Findings of fact, Paragraph 2).
The Court also found in its Findings of Fact:
"5. That George F. Robison, as the owner
of the car he was driving, also negligently contributed to the collision in which the plaintiff was
injured."
STATEM·Et~T

OF POINTS

POINT I
THE FINDINGS OF FACT BY THE LOWER COUR.T
ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE.
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"Findings not supported by any competent
evidence or which disregard uncontroverted credible evidence ... cannot be sustained and a judgment based thereon will be reversed.''
3 Am. Jur., Appeal & Error, Sec. 899, pg. 464.
We submit that the evidence was clear and uncontradicted by competent testimony that the plaintiff's
vehicle traveled only six feet into the inside northbound
lane of travel when struck by defendant's opposite bound
vehicle, and that the testimony of the plaintiff and her
aged husband to the contrary was incredible and such
that reasonable minds could not differ in refusing to
give any credence to it.
The testimony and evidence supporting the defendant's testimony that the impact occurred in the inside
lane for northbound traffic, which lane the defendant
was traveling when the accident occurred, can be summarized as follows :
Officer c·ahoon, called by the plaintiff, testified:
(Tr. 50)
"A. The first ·point of impact was eleven feet three
inches north of the north curb of Hawthorne
Avenue, and it "~as twenty-t"·o feet three
inches west of the east curb of Fifth East.
Q. And which lane of northbound traffic is that
point in 1
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A. That is the inside driving lane.

Q. And that is the lane next to the center

line~

A. That is correct."
(Tr. 51)
"Q. . . Now, then ... how far into the inside lane
had the Robison vehicle traveled when this
accident occurred~
A. . . Six feet approximately, plus or minus a
few inches. Now, that is where the point of
impact took place."
Further, we refer to Exhibit
prepared ( Tr. 46).

P-3, which this witness

Frank Bowman, .an eye witness to the accident, after
testifying that he wa_s driving south in the inside lane
of Fifth East, testified:
(Tr. 78)
"There was one car ahead of me, and the
Robison car was to the - in the lane to the right
of me. He cut in ahead of the car which was
ahead of me, crossed the double line to· go into
Hawthorne Avenue. The car ahead of me was
obliged to slow down to quit from hitting him,
and I also was obliged to slow down. As. soon as
he cros.sed the center line, why, the northbound
automobile hit him."
(Tr. 80)
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"Q. Now, how much time elapsed from the time
that the Robison car crossed the center double
lines that elapsed before the accident occurred?
A. I can't tell you that. The Robison car cut
across the line, and the - it was just across
the line, and it was hit.

Q. It was hit immediately?
A. Hit immediately, yes, indeed."
(Tr. 81)
"Q. You say the impact occurred on the lane next
to the center line, in the northbound lane next
to the center line 1
A. Next to the center line, ye.s."
(Tr. 84)

"Q. You wouldn't be able to state in the matter of
seconds as to the time which elapsed between
the time when he (Robison) cut across in front
and when the oollision actu-ally occurred, would
you?
A. Well, the amount of time was practically negligible. It happened instantaneously. The car
crossed the line. Mr. Robison's ear was hit
immediately."
William A. Robison, plaintiff's 'vitness, testified
that he was driving south on Fifth East and had observed
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the plaintiff's car following him as they proceeded towards Hawthorne Avenue (Tr. 36).
(Tr. 40)
"Q. Now what lane of travel was Mr. Willden's
car in~

A. Well, that I couldn't say.

Q. Could it have been in the inside

lane~

A. Yes, it could have been.

Q. Well, how much time elapsed, if you recall,
between the time Mr. Robison started his turn
and the time of the accident~
A. Well, it wasn't very long.

Q. It wa_s in

f~act

very short, wasn't

it~

A. That's right."
The above witnesses, we submit, fully substantiate
the defendant's testimony that he was proceeding north
in the inside lane of traffic, and that the Robison vehicle
suddenly made a left turn directly into his path and
that the impact immediately resulted in the inside lane
for northbound traffic, so suddenly, in fact, that the
defendant had time only to react and apply his brakes
at the moment of impact.
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The only evidence produced by plaintiff to refute
the above, and to establish the point of impact in the
northbound outside lane of travel, was her own testimony, and that of her husband. Mr. Robison testified
as follows:
(Tr. 5)

"Q. Now, as you proceeded south on Fifth East
toward the intersection of Hawthorne Avenue
and Fifth East, will you state what you did?

A. I looked south and saw a car coming about
three hundred feet away right in front of the
Oakwood Apartments, and I saw that I hadordinarily I had plenty of time to make the
turn because I have driven in and out there
for thirty-six years, and so I made the turn,
but he was coming at such a rate of speed that
he caught me before I got in the Avenue.
Q. Now, you s-ay that he appeared to be in front
of the Oakwood Apartments when you saw him
and as you were making your turn'"
(Tr. 6)

"A. Yes,. if anything, farther south ......"
(Tr. 12)
"Q. . .. As you were about to make your turn to
the left into Hawthorne Avenue, and you saw
the defendant's car approaching from the
south, was there any other car between yon
and hiln coming from the .south~
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A. No, definitely, there wasn't a car in front of
him.

Q. So that the view between him and you was
entirely open~
A. Yes. If there had been a car, that car would
have hit me instead of him."
(Tr. 14)
"Q. Now, which lane of traffic was Mr. Willden's
car in~
A. He was in the lane nearest the curb.

Q. So that the impact was in the outside lane of
traffic or the lane next to the parking lane~
A. Yes.

Q. Now, as you were turning, did you observe
Mr. Willden's car approaching~
A. I saw it a way down there a long, long ways
away.

Q. And did you then .see it between that point and
the time that the accident occurred~
A. Well, I saw him coining way down there, but
I didn't know that he was coming at a terrific
rate of speed, . . . .and when he was within
probably seventy-five or a hundred feet from
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the impact, I began to think maybe I would
get out of the way, and I didn't"
(Tr. 17)
"Q. Now, then, when you started your left turn,
that w.as when he was at three hundred feet
away~

A. Yes ....
A. He hit the front door first, and he was in the
outside lane next to the parking lane.

Q. Th:at would be in this lane which I am marking
'X'~

A. I suppose that is the lane he would have been
in. He wouldn't have been over in the lane next
to the curb."
(Tr. 18)

"A. I was probably in the outside lane, but just
about the right distance for him to hit my
front door."
(Tr. 21)
"Q. But in either event, when you started your
turn, Mr. Willden was three hundred feet
away?
A. Yes."
(Tr. 26)
"Q. Mr. Robison, counsel asked you about your
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deposition in which you stated that the time
you were about to make your turn, you saw the
defendant coming. He was in front of the
O.akwood Apartments, which you thought was
about two hundred fifty feet away. Since that
time have you actually measured the distance
between the intersection of Hawthorne Avenue
and the Oakwood Apartments~
A. Since that time I have measured it, .and I know
that it's - right to the street it's at least
three hundred feet."
The plaintiff testified that she had not seen the
defendant's car before the accident, and her testimony
was so vague and uncertain concerning the facts of the
accident, that we fail to see how any credence could
properly be given to it. For example:
(Tr. 115)
"Q. What did your husband do before he turned
into Hawthorne Avenue~
A. Well, you always have to slow down a little.

Q. Do you recall whether he slowed down this
time or not~
A. I guess he did. You have to when you turn in
there, not very much, but -

Q. Do you recall wh.at lane he was traveling in
before he slowed down to make the turn~
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A. Ye.s. He was traveling in the lane that he
should be to make the turn.

Q. Was that the lane next to the center

line~

A. I guess it was."
But even if we assume that the plaintiff's testimony
was corroborative of her husband's, it is our contention
that she has merely corroborated an incredible version,
not subject to ·belief by reasonable minds.
Bearing in mind that the Lower Court found no
excessive speed on the part of the defendant, the Court,
nevertheless, must have given credence to the destimony
of the plaintiff and her husband. If such be the case,
the Honorable Court believed that while the defendant's
vehicle was traveling 300 feet, at a legal speed, the
plaintiff's vehicle was, during the same time traveling
at most (assuming the Court found the impact occurred
in the outside lane), a distance of approximately 15 feet.
"Findings not supported by any competent
evidence or which disregard uncontroverted credible evidence or which are contrary to a conclusion
of law resulting from other facts found, cannot be
sustained, and a judgment based thereon will be
reversed. The question 'vhether or not the facts
found support the conclusions of la'v is one of
la,v." 3 Am. Jur. sec. 900, pg. 464.
The po.sted speed lin1it at the scene is 30

~IPH,
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44 feet per second. To travel 300 feet would, therefore,
consume almost 7 seconds. The defendant's car, 'at an
average speed of 5 MPH would require 2.1 seconds, and
the above is conside;ring the evidence in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff, in light with the Findings of
the Lower Court.
We submit, therefore, that as a matter of law, the
plaintiff's te.stimony is inherently unbelievable and that
reasonable minds would not differ.
If that be correct, then the evidence required a finding that the impact occurred only six feet into the inside
lane of travel. It needs no argument that even if the
plaintiff's vehicle were stopped before it started, it
traveled only 6 feet before impact. The defendant, admittedly traveling at a legal speed, that is not over
30 MPH, could not possibly have been over one second
away, which obviolfsly would not have given defendant,
as a matter of law, a clear opportunity to ob.serve the
danger, react to it, and bring his car to a stop to avoid
the accident.
We submit, therefore, that the Court's findings of
negligence upon the defendant were not supported by
competent evidence, and that defendant is entitled to a
reversal of the judgment, with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the defendant, No Cause of Action.
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POINT II
THE DEFENDANT'~S NEGLIGENCE, AS FOUND BY
THE LOWER COURT, WAS FOUND IN ERRO·R AND WAS
NOT A PRO·XIMATE CAU·SE OF THE PLAINTIFF'S INJURIE;S.

The Court found the defendant negligent in two
particulars :

1. Failure to yield the right of way, which we submit was error.
2. F.ailing to keep a proper lookout, which we submit wa.s not a proximate cause of the accident.
The Court also found !fr. Robison, plaintiff's husband, negligent and his negligence a proximate cause of
the accident.
The Court's Findings that the RQbison vehicle had
the right-of-way over defendant's vehicle, was not supported by any evidence, and \Yas contradictory and constitutes error as a matter of la\v.
The Court either found that the left turning Rob~on
vehicle travelled only 6 feet into the opposite bound
inside traffic lane \vhen struck, "~hich finding \Yas supported by the over\vhehning "~eight of the evidence~ or
the Court 1nay have found that the in1pact occurred in
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the opposite bound outside lane, according to the unsupported testimony of the plaintiff and her aged husband.
In the first place, we respectfully submit that the
plaintiff's vehicle was not entitled to the right-of-way,
regardles.s of the Court's Findings above, inasmuch as
the Robison vehicle was not within an intersection when
Mr. Robison made his left turn, as required by the Right
of Way Statute, Article 9, 41-6-73, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, which reads :
"The driver of a vehicle within an intersection
intending to turn left shall yield the right of way
to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which is within the intersection or so close
thereto as to con.stitute an immediate hazard ... ''
Further, we refer the Court to Article 8, 41-6-66,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, with relation to the requirements of a proper left turn at an intersection.
"The driver of a vehicle intending to turn
at an intersection shall do so as follows:
(b) At any intersection where traffic is permitted to move in both directions on each roadway entering the intersection, an approach for a
left turn shall be made in that portion of the
right half of the roadway nearest the center line
thereof and by passing to the right of such center
line where it enters the intersection and after
entering the intersection the left turn shall be
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made so as to leave the intersection to the right
of the center line of the roadway being entered.

Whenever practicable the left turn shall be made
in that portion of the intersection to the left of
the center of the intersection."
The uncontradicted evidence, produced by plaintiff,
in the investigating officer's testimony, and in the exhibit
P-3 offered by plaintiff, shows that the point of impact
occurred 11 feet 3 inches north of the north curb of Hawthorne Avenue, indicating clearly that Mr. Robison was
"cutting the corner," and must obviously have started
his left turn when his vehicle was ap·proxirnately a car
length away from the intersection, in direct violation of
the above statutory regulations.
It needs no extensive argument for the proposition
that a motorist may not seize the right-of-\Yay by violating the express provision of the law.
"In order for a driver to claim the right of
way on the basis of\ entering the intersection first,
it must appear that he did not speed up just for
the purpose of clain1ing the right of \Yay, and
also that the 1nargin or distance by ,,~hich he
claimed it 'va.s so clear as to be \Yithout doubt."
2 Blashfield Cyrl. Auto L.a\\'" & Practice, sec. 991,
quoted with approval in l\Iartin Ys. Stevens, -------Utah ________ , 243 P. 2nd @ 750.
While the facts in that case are not parallel to the
case at Bar, the state1nent of the la\v \Yith relation to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
right of way must of necessity apply to left turning
vehicles when there are opposite bound vehicles approaching.
See also, Cedarloff vs. Whited, infra pg. --------·
But aside from the above, it is readily apparent from
the facts, considered in their favorable light to the plaintiff, that as a matter of law Mr. Robison started his left
turn when the defendant's vehicle wa~ so close as to
constitute a hazard. For this purpose, therefore, we
will assume that the impact occurred in the northbound
outside lane, which, again, is contradictory to plaintiff's
own witness, Officer 'C'ahoon.
We submit the following analysis as a combined
argument that the Robison vehicle, for another reason,
did not have the right-of-way as a matter of la,v, and
that the negligence of the defendant in failing to keep
a proper lookout could not have been a proximate cause
·of the resulting accident.
Bearing in mind that the Honorable Trial Court
found no negligence on the part of defendant with relation to sveed, and assuming our Point One is in error,
and the Lower Court would have properly found that the
impact occurred in the outside lane of travel, the following propositions, for the sake of this argument, can be
accepted:
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1. That the speed of defendant's car, considered
most favorably to plaintiff, was 30 mph, the
posted speed limit at the scene.
2. That the impact occurred in the outside lane
for northbound traffic.
3. That the defendant stopped before starting his
left turn and that he was traveling, according
to his own testimony, .at 10 mph at the impact,
or an average speed of 5 mph.
4. That defendant's car left no brake marks.
Based on the above, the defendant's vehicle was
traveling at 44 feet per second; the plaintiff's at 7 feet
per second.
Based on the above propositions, it can be BJ;sumed
with reasonable accuracy, that the plaintiff's vehicle
traveled 16 feet after crossing the center double lines
(based on the width of the inside lane, 10 feet plus 6 f~et
into the outside lane) ; that the time consumed (at 7 feet
per second) was 2.3 seconds ; that during that time defendant's vehicle would have traveled 101.2 feet (+± feet
per second x 2.3 seconds).
The defendant's vehicle, traveling 30 mph, would
have required 79 feet to eo1ne to a con1plete stop, including the norn1al reaction tilne of 33 feet, plus the full
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braking distance of 46 feet. (See Utah Highway Patrol
booklet.)
It is clear, therefore, that the defendant had 22.2
feet, or one-half second, during which presumably, from
the Lower Court's Findings, he was not keeping a proper
lookout, as quite obviously had defendant seen the plaintiff's left turning vehicle when he was 79 feet away,
and he re.acted immediately and came to a "screaming"
stop, his front bumper would have touched the side of
the plaintiff's vehicle.
But the above yard stick and mathematical evaluation of the defendant's conduct is both unrealistic and
ridiculous. It completely ignores the human .equation of
the perception time that elapses, the realization time that
is always present when a motorist is confronted with a
sudden and unexpected emergency, and it is common
knowledge that tho.se times can and do consume as _high
as two seconds.
It further ignores the fact, which this Court has
stated on other occasions, that the defendant, had he been
"staring" at the Robison vehicle before that vehicle
started its left turn, would have been justified in believing that Mr. Robison would obey the law.
"Where one operating his vehicle on the
proper side of the street makes a survey of the
condition of the street ahead and observes no one
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coming on his side of the street but sees one
coming toward him on the opposite side of the
street, he may as.sume that such person will continue on the opposite side." Richards vs. Palace
Laundry, 55 Utah 409, 186 Pac. 439.
To hold defendant negligent for not "reacting" at
the commencement of those 22 feet 2 inches is to place
upon him the onus of detecting, realizing danger, and
reacting, the very split second that the plaintiff's vehicle
illegally started into the inside laneJ and allowing defendant no time whatsoever to determine that Robison
was not meTely crawling part way into his turn and
that ·he would in fact stop clear of the defendant's
approach and allow him to clear before continuing to
complete his left turn. This Court has already previously
stated that the defendant is under no such unrealistic rule
of conduct.
We contend that the facts of the case at Bar are
the same, in legal effect, as the facts in Cederloff vs.
Whited} 169 Pac. 2nd 778, although in that case the defendant was the left turning Yehicle.
"If the jury found that the defendant made the
turn very slowly, in accordance with his testimony, then his negligence 'vas the sole pro:xllnate
cause of the collision. Had the driver of plaintiff's
car observed defendant slo"~ly n1aking the turn,
in accordance 'vith defendant's te.stimony, he
would be justified in assun1ing that defendant
had seen his approach and 'vould stop, as the law
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required him to before entering the northbound
traffic lane, and allow plaintiff's car to pass. To
drive in that manner would be an invitation to
the driver of plaintiff's car to continue in his
regular course, and when defendant continued to
crawl into plaintiff's lane of traffic and failed
to stop, as the law required him to do, it would
be too late to avoid the accident by the time that
plaintiff's driver could discover that defendant
was not going to stop. Thus, as a matter of law,
defendant's negligence would be the sole proximate cause of the accident. Even though the
plaintiff's driver failed to keep a proper lookout,
and for that reason did not see defendant slowly
making the turn, such failure would not be a proximate contributing cause of the collision because
he could not, under those circumstances, be reason
ably expected to have done any different than he
did had he kept a proper lookout."
"It would take time after defendant commenced to turn before plaintiff's driver, if keeping a proper lookout, would be able to realize that
defendant was turning and was not merely weaving slightly from side to side, and after that, if
defendant was traveling fast enough to indicate
that he did not intend to stop, his car would. have
to travel such a short distance before he would
be directly in front of plaintiff's car in the course
of his travel so that plaintiff's car would not have
time to stop and thereby avoid a collision . . .
So under these circumstance.s, plaintiff could not
have avoided the accident, and defendant's negligence was, as a matter of law, the sole· proximate
cause of the collision and resulting injury, and
the Court erred in not so instructing the jury."
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It is customary, and not at all unusual, for a vehicle
at an intersection, intending to turn left, to crawl forward
in its left turn into the inside lane for opposite bound
traffic, when there are no vehicles approaching therein,
and to stop before encroaching into the outside lane
until an approaching vehicle in the lane has cleared.
Such a maneuver is salutary and to be encouraged, inasmuch as it permits cars behind the left turning vehicle to
proceed forward and assists in the flow of traffic.
An analogous custom has been noted by this Court,
with approval, in Hickock vs. Skinner, 190 Pac. 2nd 514,
at 517:
"It is not unusual for drivers crossing a wide
arterial highway such as this to proceed across
the near half of the street and then stop or
come to a near stop near the middle to permit
the passage of through traffic on the other half."
It is quite apparent, therefore, that if the defendant
were allowed only one second to observe the Robison
vehicle start up, and assuming that he thereafter immediately reacted to the emergency, the defendant's car would
then be only 57.2 feet from the point of n11pact, 33 feet of
which would then be ronsu1ned in getting his brakes
applied, and the ren1aining 24.2 feet only remaining
1n which to stop.
From the foregoing, "Te subn1it that the plaintiff's
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vehicle most certainly did not have the right-of-way. To
uphold the Lower Court's Findings in this respeet would
be a sanction by this Court for left turning vehicles
to create emergencies and place the burden upon opposite
bound vehicles to get out of the emergency as best they
could.
This c·ourt, obviously, has not condoned that pr.actice, and we refer to French vs. Utah Oil Refining Co.,
216 Pac. 2nd 1002 @ pg. 1004:
"When a statute prescribes that a turning
vehicle must yield the right-of-way to another on a
straight of way when the latter is close enough
to constitute a hazard, it anticip.ates the exercise
of reasonable judgment on the part of the driver
turning. However, a burden is placed on the
driver making the turn as he has control of the
situation, and if there is a reasonable probability
that the movement cannot be made in safety, then
the disfavored driver should yield. The driver
proceeding straight ahead has little opportunity
to know a vehicle is to be turned across his path
until the movement is commenced and in many
instances, the warning is too late for the latter
driver to take effective action."
We earnestly submit, therefore, that the Honorable
District Court erred in its Findings that the Robison
vehicle had the right of way, and further erred in finding
that the defendant's negligence in failing to keep a
proper lookout was a proximate cause of the accident
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and the resulting injuries to plaintiff. We submit therefore, that the defendant is entitled to .a reversal of the
judgment, with instructions to enter judgment for the
defendant.
Respectfully submitted,

LOUIS E. MIDGLEY
Attorney for Defendant and
Appellant
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